Analyzing Cross-country Pandemic Connectedness During COVID-19 Using a Spatial-Temporal Database: Network Analysis.

Communicable diseases including COVID-19 pose a major threat to public health worldwide. To curb the spread of communicable diseases effectively, timely surveillance and prediction of the risk of pandemics are essential. The aim of this study is to analyze free and publicly available data to construct useful travel data records for network statistics other than common descriptive statistics. This study describes analytical findings of time-series plots and spatial-temporal maps to illustrate or visualize pandemic connectedness. We analyzed data retrieved from the web-based Collaborative Arrangement for the Prevention and Management of Public Health Events in Civil Aviation dashboard, which contains up-to-date and comprehensive meta-information on civil flights from 193 national governments in accordance with the airport, country, city, latitude, and the longitude of flight origin and the destination. We used the database to visualize pandemic connectedness through the workflow of travel data collection, network construction, data aggregation, travel statistics calculation, and visualization with time-series plots and spatial-temporal maps. We observed similar patterns in the time-series plots of worldwide daily flights from January to early-March of 2019 and 2020. A sharp reduction in the number of daily flights recorded in mid-March 2020 was likely related to large-scale air travel restrictions owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. The levels of connectedness between places are strong indicators of the risk of a pandemic. Since the initial reports of COVID-19 cases worldwide, a high network density and reciprocity in early-March 2020 served as early signals of the COVID-19 pandemic and were associated with the rapid increase in COVID-19 cases in mid-March 2020. The spatial-temporal map of connectedness in Europe on March 13, 2020, shows the highest level of connectedness among European countries, which reflected severe outbreaks of COVID-19 in late March and early April of 2020. As a quality control measure, we used the aggregated numbers of international flights from April to October 2020 to compare the number of international flights officially reported by the International Civil Aviation Organization with the data collected from the Collaborative Arrangement for the Prevention and Management of Public Health Events in Civil Aviation dashboard, and we observed high consistency between the 2 data sets. The flexible design of the database provides users access to network connectedness at different periods, places, and spatial levels through various network statistics calculation methods in accordance with their needs. The analysis can facilitate early recognition of the risk of a current communicable disease pandemic and newly emerging communicable diseases in the future.

Cryptic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and the first COVID-19 wave.

Considerable uncertainty surrounds the timeline of introductions and onsets of local transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) globally1-7. Although a limited number of SARS-CoV-2 introductions were reported in January and February 2020 (refs.8,9), the narrowness of the initial testing criteria, combined with a slow growth in testing capacity and porous travel screening10, left many countries vulnerable to unmitigated, cryptic transmission. Here we use a global metapopulation epidemic model to provide a mechanistic understanding of the early dispersal of infections and the temporal windows of the introduction of SARS-CoV-2 and onset of local transmission in Europe and the USA. We find that community transmission of SARS-CoV-2 was likely to have been present in several areas of Europe and the USA by January 2020, and estimate that by early March, only 1 to 4 in 100 SARS-CoV-2 infections were detected by surveillance systems. The modelling results highlight international travel as the key driver of the introduction of SARS-CoV-2, with possible introductions and transmission events as early as December 2019 to January 2020. We find a heterogeneous geographic distribution of cumulative infection attack rates by 4 July 2020, ranging from 0.78% to 15.2% across US states and 0.19% to 13.2% in European countries. Our approach complements phylogenetic analyses and other surveillance approaches and provides insights that can be used to design innovative, model-driven surveillance systems that guide enhanced testing and response strategies.

Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 during air travel: a descriptive and modelling study.

OBJECTIVES: To explore the potential of SARS-CoV-2 spread during air travel and the risk of in-flight transmission. METHODS: We enrolled all passengers and crew suspected of being infected with SARS-CoV-2, who bounded for Beijing on international flights. We specified the characteristics of all confirmed cases of COVID-19 infection and utilised Wells-Riley equation to estimate the infectivity of COVID-19 during air travel. RESULTS: We screened 4492 passengers and crew with suspected COVID-19 infection, verified 161 confirmed cases (mean age 28.6 years), and traced two confirmed cases who may have been infected in the aircraft. The estimated infectivity was 375 quanta/h (range 274-476), while the effective infectivity was only 4 quanta/h (range 2-5). The risk of per-person infection during a 13 h air travel in economy class was 0.56‰ (95% CI 0.41‰-0.72‰). CONCLUSION: We found that the universal use of face masks on the flight, together with the plane's ventilation system, significantly decreased the infectivity of COVID-19.KEY MESSAGESThe COVID-19 pandemic is changing the lifestyle in the world, especially air travel which has the potential to spread SARS-CoV-2.The universal use of face masks on the flight, together with the plane's ventilation system, significantly decreased the infectivity of COVID-19 on an aircraft.Our findings suggest that the risk of infection in aircraft was negligible.

The role of high-speed rail and air travel in the spread of COVID-19 in China.

BACKGROUND: Public transportation is a major facilitator of the spread of infectious diseases and has been a focus of policy interventions aiming to suppress the current COVID-19 epidemic. METHODS: We use a random-effects panel data model and a Difference-in-Differences in Reverse (DDR) model to examine how air and rail transport links with Wuhan as well as the suspension of these transport links influenced the development of the epidemic in China. RESULTS: We find high-speed rail (HSR) and air connectivity with Wuhan resulted in 25.4% and 21.2% increases in the average number of daily new confirmed cases, respectively, while their suspension led to 18.6% and 13.3% decreases in that number. We also find that the suspension effect was dynamic, growing stronger over time and peaking 20-23 days after the Wuhan lockdown, then gradually wearing off. It took approximately four weeks for this effect to fully materialize, roughly twice the maximum incubation period, and similar dynamic patterns were seen in both HSR and air models. Overall, HSR had a greater impact on COVID-19 development than air transport. CONCLUSIONS: Our research provides important evidence for implementing transportation-related policies in controlling future infectious diseases.

Timeliness of contact tracing among flight passengers during the COVID-19 epidemic in Vietnam.

BACKGROUND: International air travel plays an important role in the global spread of SARS-CoV-2, and tracing of close contacts is an integral part of the public health response to COVID-19. We aimed to assess the timeliness of contact tracing among airline passengers arriving in Vietnam on flights containing COVID-19 cases and investigated factors associated with timeliness of contact tracing. METHODS: We included data from 2228 passengers on 22 incoming flights between 2 and 19 March 2020. Contact tracing duration was assessed separately for the time between the date of index case confirmation and date of contact tracing initiation (interval I), and the date of contact tracing initiation and completion (interval II). We used log-rank tests and multivariable Poisson regression models to identify factors associated with timeliness. RESULTS: The median duration of interval I and interval II was one (IQR: 1-2) and 3 days (IQR: 2-5), respectively. The contact tracing duration was shorter for passengers from flights where the index case was identified through mandatory testing directly upon arrival (median = 4; IQR: 3-5) compared to flights with index case detection through self-presentation at health facilities after arrival (median = 7; IQR: 5-8) (p-value = 0.018). Cumulative hazards for successful tracing were higher for Vietnamese nationals compared to non-Vietnamese nationals (p < 0.001). CONCLUSIONS: Contact tracing among flight passengers in the early stage of the COVID-19 epidemic in Vietnam was timely though delays occurred on high workload days. Mandatory SARS-CoV-2 testing at arrival may reduce contact tracing duration and should be considered as an integrated screening tool for flight passengers from high-risk areas when entering low-transmission settings with limited contact tracing capacity. We recommend a standardized risk-based contact tracing approach for flight passengers during the ongoing COVID-19 epidemic.

Change in outbreak epicentre and its impact on the importation risks of COVID-19 progression: A modelling study.

BACKGROUND: The outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) that was first detected in the city of Wuhan, China has now spread to every inhabitable continent, but now the attention has shifted from China to other epicentres. This study explored early assessment of the influence of spatial proximities and travel patterns from Italy on the further spread of SARS-CoV-2 worldwide. METHODS: Using data on the number of confirmed cases of COVID-19 and air travel data between countries, we applied a stochastic meta-population model to estimate the global spread of COVID-19. Pearson's correlation, semi-variogram, and Moran's Index were used to examine the association and spatial autocorrelation between the number of COVID-19 cases and travel influx (and arrival time) from the source country. RESULTS: We found significant negative association between disease arrival time and number of cases imported from Italy (r = -0.43, p = 0.004) and significant positive association between the number of COVID-19 cases and daily travel influx from Italy (r = 0.39, p = 0.011). Using bivariate Moran's Index analysis, we found evidence of spatial interaction between COVID-19 cases and travel influx (Moran's I = 0.340). Asia-Pacific region is at higher/extreme risk of disease importation from the Chinese epicentre, whereas the rest of Europe, South-America and Africa are more at risk from the Italian epicentre. CONCLUSION: We showed that as the epicentre changes, the dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 spread change to reflect spatial proximities.

Tracking the spread of COVID-19 in India via social networks in the early phase of the pandemic.

BACKGROUND: The coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) has spread worldwide via international travel. This study traced its diffusion from the global to national level and identified a few superspreaders that played a central role in the transmission of this disease in India. DATA AND METHODS: We used the travel history of infected patients from 30 January to 6 April 6 2020 as the primary data source. A total of 1386 cases were assessed, of which 373 were international and 1013 were national contacts. The networks were generated in Gephi software (version 0.9.2). RESULTS: The maximum numbers of connections were established from Dubai (degree 144) and the UK (degree 64). Dubai's eigenvector centrality was the highest that made it the most influential node. The statistical metrics calculated from the data revealed that Dubai and the UK played a crucial role in spreading the disease in Indian states and were the primary sources of COVID-19 importations into India. Based on the modularity class, different clusters were shown to form across Indian states, which demonstrated the formation of a multi-layered social network structure. A significant increase in confirmed cases was reported in states like Tamil Nadu, Delhi and Andhra Pradesh during the first phase of the nationwide lockdown, which spanned from 25 March to 14 April 2020. This was primarily attributed to a gathering at the Delhi Religious Conference known as Tabliqui Jamaat. CONCLUSIONS: COVID-19 got induced into Indian states mainly due to International travels with the very first patient travelling from Wuhan, China. Subsequently, the contacts of positive cases were located, and a significant spread was identified in states like Gujarat, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Kerala and Karnataka. The COVID-19's spread in phase one was traced using the travelling history of the patients, and it was found that most of the transmissions were local.

Risk of COVID-19 importation to the Pacific islands through global air travel.

On 30 January 2020, WHO declared coronavirus (COVID-19) a global public health emergency. As of 12 March 2020, 125 048 confirmed COVID-19 cases in 118 countries had been reported. On 12 March 2020, the first case in the Pacific islands was reported in French Polynesia; no other Pacific island country or territory has reported cases. The purpose of our analysis is to show how travellers may introduce COVID-19 into the Pacific islands and discuss the role robust health systems play in protecting health and reducing transmission risk. We analyse travel and Global Health Security Index data using a scoring tool to produce quantitative estimates of COVID-19 importation risk, by departing and arriving country. Our analysis indicates that, as of 12 March 2020, the highest risk air routes by which COVID-19 may be imported into the Pacific islands are from east Asian countries (specifically, China, Korea and Japan) to north Pacific airports (likely Guam, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands or, to a less extent, Palau); or from China, Japan, Singapore, the United States of America or France to south Pacific ports (likely, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, French Polynesia or New Caledonia). Other importation routes include from other east Asian countries to Guam, and from Australia, New Zealand and other European countries to the south Pacific. The tool provides a useful method for assessing COVID-19 importation risk and may be useful in other settings.

Symptoms and Characteristics Which Require Attention During COVID-19 Screening at a Port of Entry.

BACKGROUND: The quarantine process at a country's port of entry has an important role in preventing an influx of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases from abroad and further minimizing the national healthcare burden of COVID-19. However, there has been little published on the process of COVID-19 screening among travelers entering into a country. Identifying the characteristics of COVID-19 infected travelers could help attenuate the further spread of the disease. METHODS: The authors analyzed epidemiological investigation forms and real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) results for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) of entrants to Incheon International Airport between March 11 to April 30, 2020. We performed univariate and multivariate logistic regression analysis to determine the odds of positive SARS-CoV-2 result. RESULTS: A total of 11,074 entrants underwent reverse-transcription PCR for SARS-CoV-2, resulting 388 confirmed cases of COVID-19 infection. COVID-19 had a strong association with the reported loss of smell or taste and association with self-reported fever, chill, cough, and vomiting. If a traveler reported contact with an individual with either respiratory symptoms or confirmed COVID-19 in the last two weeks directly prior to landing, the probability of a positive result was increased. CONCLUSION: If overseas travelers experience loss of smell or taste in the two weeks prior to arrival, they may require an immediate examination to rule out COVID-19 at a port of entry. As to measure body temperature upon arrival at a port of entry, it is important to screen for any occurrence of fever within the two weeks prior to travel. Also, information with epidemiological relevance, such as recent contact with an individual suffering from any respiratory symptoms or with confirmed COVID-19, should be included in COVID-19 screening questionnaires for international travelers.

Interplay Between Air Travel, Genome Integrity, and COVID-19 Risk vis-a-vis Flight Crew.

During air travel, flight crew (flight attendants, pilots) can be exposed to numerous flight-related environmental DNA damaging agents that may be at the root of an excess risk of cancer and other diseases. This already complex mix of exposures is now joined by SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. The complex exposures experienced during air travel present a challenge to public health research, but also provide an opportunity to consider new strategies for understanding and countering their health effects. In this article, we focus on threats to genomic integrity that occur during air travel and discuss how these threats and our ability to respond to them may influence the risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection and the development of range of severity of the symptoms. We also discuss how the virus itself may lead to compromised genome integrity. We argue that dauntingly complex public health problems, such as the challenge of protecting flight crews from COVID-19, must be met with interdisciplinary research teams that include epidemiologists, engineers, and mechanistic biologists.

Strategies at points of entry to reduce importation risk of COVID-19 cases and reopen travel.

BACKGROUND: With more countries exiting lockdown, public health safety requires screening measures at international travel entry points that can prevent the reintroduction or importation of the severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus-2. Here, we estimate the number of cases captured, quarantining days averted and secondary cases expected to occur with screening interventions. METHODS: To estimate active case exportation risk from 153 countries with recorded coronavirus disease-2019 cases and deaths, we created a simple data-driven framework to calculate the number of infectious and upcoming infectious individuals out of 100 000 000 potential travellers from each country, and assessed six importation risk reduction strategies; Strategy 1 (S1) has no screening on entry, S2 tests all travellers and isolates test-positives where those who test negative at 7 days are permitted entry, S3 the equivalent but for a 14 day period, S4 quarantines all travellers for 7 days where all are subsequently permitted entry, S5 the equivalent for 14 days and S6 the testing of all travellers and prevention of entry for those who test positive. RESULTS: The average reduction in case importation across countries relative to S1 is 90.2% for S2, 91.7% for S3, 55.4% for S4, 91.2% for S5 and 77.2% for S6. An average of 79.6% of infected travellers are infectious upon arrival. For the top 100 exporting countries, an 88.2% average reduction in secondary cases is expected through S2 with the 7-day isolation of test-positives, increasing to 92.1% for S3 for 14-day isolation. A substantially smaller reduction of 30.0% is expected for 7-day all traveller quarantining, increasing to 84.3% for 14-day all traveller quarantining. CONCLUSIONS: The testing and isolation of test-positives should be implemented provided good testing practices are in place. If testing is not feasible, quarantining for a minimum of 14 days is recommended with strict adherence measures in place.

Air travel and COVID-19 prevention in the pandemic and peri-pandemic period: A narrative review.

Air travel during the COVID-19 pandemic is challenging for travellers, airlines, airports, health authorities, and governments. We reviewed multiple aspects of COVID peri-pandemic air travel, including data on traveller numbers, peri-flight prevention, and testing recommendations and in-flight SARS-CoV-2 transmission, photo-epidemiology of mask use, the pausing of air travel to mass gathering events, and quarantine measures and their effectiveness. Flights are reduced by 43% compared to 2019. Hygiene measures, mask use, and distancing are effective, while temperature screening has been shown to be unreliable. Although the risk of in-flight transmission is considered to be very low, estimated at one case per 27 million travellers, confirmed in-flight cases have been published. Some models exist and predict minimal risk but fail to consider human behavior and airline procedures variations. Despite aircraft high-efficiency filtering, there is some evidence that passengers within two rows of an index case are at higher risk. Air travel to mass gatherings should be avoided. Antigen testing is useful but impaired by time lag to results. Widespread application of solutions such as saliva-based, rapid testing or even detection with the help of "sniffer dogs" might be the way forward. The "traffic light system" for traveling, recently introduced by the Council of the European Union is a first step towards normalization of air travel. Quarantine of travellers may delay introduction or re-introduction of the virus, or may delay the peak of transmission, but the effect is small and there is limited evidence. New protocols detailing on-arrival, rapid testing and tracing are indicated to ensure that restricted movement is pragmatically implemented. Guidelines from airlines are non-transparent. Most airlines disinfect their flights and enforce wearing masks and social distancing to a certain degree. A layered approach of non-pharmaceutical interventions, screening and testing procedures, implementation and adherence to distancing, hygiene measures and mask use at airports, in-flight and throughout the entire journey together with pragmatic post-flight testing and tracing are all effective measures that can be implemented. Ongoing research and systematic review are indicated to provide evidence on the utility of preventive measures and to help answer the question "is it safe to fly?".

Uncovering two phases of early intercontinental COVID-19 transmission dynamics.

BACKGROUND: The COVID-19 pandemic has posed an ongoing global crisis, but how the virus spread across the world remains poorly understood. This is of vital importance for informing current and future pandemic response strategies. METHODS: We performed two independent analyses, travel network-based epidemiological modelling and Bayesian phylogeographic inference, to investigate the intercontinental spread of COVID-19. RESULTS: Both approaches revealed two distinct phases of COVID-19 spread by the end of March 2020. In the first phase, COVID-19 largely circulated in China during mid-to-late January 2020 and was interrupted by containment measures in China. In the second and predominant phase extending from late February to mid-March, unrestricted movements between countries outside of China facilitated intercontinental spread, with Europe as a major source. Phylogenetic analyses also revealed that the dominant strains circulating in the USA were introduced from Europe. However, stringent restrictions on international travel across the world since late March have substantially reduced intercontinental transmission. CONCLUSIONS: Our analyses highlight that heterogeneities in international travel have shaped the spatiotemporal characteristics of the pandemic. Unrestricted travel caused a large number of COVID-19 exportations from Europe to other continents between late February and mid-March, which facilitated the COVID-19 pandemic. Targeted restrictions on international travel from countries with widespread community transmission, together with improved capacity in testing, genetic sequencing and contact tracing, can inform timely strategies for mitigating and containing ongoing and future waves of COVID-19 pandemic.